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What and Who

Asynchronous Market Dynamics and Asynchronous Gradient Descent

Yun Kuen Cheung
University of Vienna
AG1 Mittagsseminar (own work)
AG 1, AG 2, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, RG1, SWS, MMCI  
AG Audience
English

Date, Time and Location

Tuesday, 24 February 2015
13:00
30 Minutes
E1 4
024
Saarbrücken

Abstract

In the studies of markets and general equilibrium theory, one important and long-lasting question is to seek market dynamics that converge quickly to market equilibrium. The importance in this line of research is: if an equilibrium is realizable, there ought to be a natural and realistic market process that finds it. Theoretical computer science has shed new insight on the problem in the past 20 years, both from algorithmic and complexity perspectives.


In this work, we focus on a natural market dynamic called tatonnement. My previous work with Cole and Devanur showed that in Fisher markets with CES utility functions, tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent on a convex function, while each minimum of the convex function corresponds to a market equilibrium. This allowed us to show that tatonnement converges to a market equilibrium quickly, assuming prices updates are synchronous.

However, real markets are typically distributed with no central governance, i.e., prices are updated asynchronously, and possibly with outdated information. We design an asynchronous tatonnement rule that incorporates these features, and we develop an amortized technique to analyze asynchronous tatonnement. We show that asynchronous tatonnement converges to market equilibrium in Fisher markets with CES utility functions, by suitably reducing the step sizes used in the asynchronous tatonnement rule.

The update rule and the amortized analysis can be extended to the more general context of asynchronous gradient descent. We note that the amortized analysis may be of independent interests, particularly, in analyzing other asynchronous systems.

This is joint work with Richard Cole (New York University).

Contact

Martin Hoefer
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Martin Hoefer, 02/11/2015 15:44
Martin Hoefer, 02/03/2015 18:42
Martin Hoefer, 02/03/2015 17:28 -- Created document.