Campus Event Calendar

Event Entry

New for: D3

What and Who

Generalized Second Price Auction with Markovian Users

Jiajin Yu
Fudan University, Shanghai
PhD Application Talk
AG 1, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, MMCI  
Public Audience

Date, Time and Location

Tuesday, 16 February 2010
90 Minutes
E1 4


Sponsored search auction is used by most search engines to find ads showing on the web page of search results. The income of this targeted advertising business is a big part of the revenue of most search engines. The most widely used approach is called Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Most previous works about GSP auction are based on the separation assumption: the probability a user will click on an ad is composed by two independent parts: a quality factor of the ad itself and a position factor of the slot of the ad. This previous model does not include the externality a higher ad may bring to the ads below it. We study a GSP auction in a Markovian user model where the externality is included by modeling a user's probability behavior of scanning ad list. In particular, we propose a new ranking scheme for the bidders. We prove Nash

equilibrium always exists in the auction and study the efficiency of the auction by theoretical analysis and simulation. We compare our results with social optimum and previous approaches. Comparison shows that our results approximate the social optimum and improve previous approaches under various circumstances.


IMPRS-CS Office Team
0681 93 25 225
--email hidden
passcode not visible
logged in users only

Tags, Category, Keywords and additional notes

Stephanie Jörg, 02/12/2010 12:00 -- Created document.