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Event Entry
New for: D3
What and Who
Generalized Second Price Auction with Markovian Users
Jiajin Yu
Fudan University, Shanghai
PhD Application Talk
AG 1, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, MMCI
Public Audience
English
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Date, Time and Location
Tuesday, 16 February 2010
13:40
90 Minutes
E1 4
024
Saarbrücken
Abstract
Sponsored search auction is used by most search engines to find ads showing on the web page of search results. The income of this targeted advertising business is a big part of the revenue of most search engines. The most widely used approach is called Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction. Most previous works about GSP auction are based on the separation assumption: the probability a user will click on an ad is composed by two independent parts: a quality factor of the ad itself and a position factor of the slot of the ad. This previous model does not include the externality a higher ad may bring to the ads below it. We study a GSP auction in a Markovian user model where the externality is included by modeling a user's probability behavior of scanning ad list. In particular, we propose a new ranking scheme for the bidders. We prove Nash
equilibrium always exists in the auction and study the efficiency of the auction by theoretical analysis and simulation. We compare our results with social optimum and previous approaches. Comparison shows that our results approximate the social optimum and improve previous approaches under various circumstances.
Contact
IMPRS-CS Office Team
0681 93 25 225
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Tags, Category, Keywords and additional notes
Stephanie Jörg, 02/12/2010 12:00 -- Created document.