Campus Event Calendar
Event Entry
What and Who
Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: Advances in Maximin Share Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations.
Masoud Seddighin
Assistant Professor at the Tehran Institute for Advanced Studies, Iran
AG1 Mittagsseminar (own work)
AG 1
AG Audience
English
Note: We use this to send email in the morning.
Date, Time and Location
Thursday, 6 March 2025
13:00
30 Minutes
E1 4
024
Saarbrücken
Abstract
In this talk, I address the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents with diverse preferences, focusing on the maximin share (MMS) fairness criterion. The MMS represents the minimum value an agent can guarantee for themselves by partitioning the items into $n$ bundles and receiving the least preferred one. While prior work established the existence of a ${1}/{\log m}$-approximate MMS allocation under subadditive valuations, this guarantee becomes impractical as $m$ grows. I present recent advancements that significantly improve this approximation factor for subadditive valuations.
Contact
Nidhi Rathi
+49 681 9325 1134
--email hidden
Virtual Meeting Details
Zoom
897 027 2575
passcode not visible
logged in users only
Nidhi Rathi, 03/05/2025 14:46 -- Created document.