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Event Entry
What and Who
SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-Generation Networks
Adrian Perrig
Carnegie Mellon University
SWS Distinguished Lecture Series
Adrian Perrig is a Professor in Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Engineering and Public Policy, and Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon
University. Adrian serves as the technical director for Carnegie
Mellon's Cybersecurity Laboratory (CyLab). He earned his Ph.D. degree
in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon University, and spent three
years during his Ph.D. degree at the University of California at
Berkeley. He received his B.Sc. degree in Computer Engineering from
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Adrian's
research revolves around building secure systems and includes network
security, trustworthy computing and security for social networks. More
specifically, he is interested in trust establishment, trustworthy
code execution in the presence of malware, and how to design secure
next-generation networks. More information about his research is
available on <A HREF="http://www.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/">Adrian</A>'s
web page. He is a recipient of the NSF CAREER award in 2004, IBM
faculty fellowships in 2004 and 2005, the Sloan research fellowship in
2006, the Security 7 award in the category of education by the
Information Security Magazine in 2009, and the Benjamin Richard Teare
teaching award in 2011
AG 1, AG 2, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, MMCI
Expert Audience
English
Note: We use this to send email in the morning.
Date, Time and Location
Wednesday, 28 March 2012
11:00
60 Minutes
E1 5
5th floor
Saarbrücken
Abstract
We present the first Internet architecture designed to provide route
control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for
end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of
independent routing sub-planes, called trust domains, which then
interconnect to form complete routes. Trust domains provide natural
isolation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give
endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic,
provide meaningful and enforceable trust, and enable scalable routing
updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture
provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic
consequence of good design principles, avoiding piecemeal add-on
protocols as security patches. Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a
few top-tier ISPs in the trust domain are trusted for providing
reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted
Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results
show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a
high level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.
control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for
end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of
independent routing sub-planes, called trust domains, which then
interconnect to form complete routes. Trust domains provide natural
isolation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give
endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic,
provide meaningful and enforceable trust, and enable scalable routing
updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture
provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic
consequence of good design principles, avoiding piecemeal add-on
protocols as security patches. Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a
few top-tier ISPs in the trust domain are trusted for providing
reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted
Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results
show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a
high level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation.
Contact
Brigitta Hansen
0681 - 93039102
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Brigitta Hansen, 03/07/2012 16:11 -- Created document.