Campus Event Calendar
Event Entry
What and Who
Towards a Secure DNS
Haya Shulman
Bar Ilan University, Israel
SWS Colloquium
AG 1, AG 2, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, MMCI
MPI Audience
English
Note: We use this to send email in the morning.
Date, Time and Location
Tuesday, 12 February 2013
13:00
90 Minutes
E1 5
029
Saarbrücken
Abstract
Most caching DNS resolvers still rely for their security, against poisoning, on validating that the DNS responses contain
some ‘unpredictable’ values, copied from the request. These values include the 16 bit identifier field, and other fields,
some ‘unpredictable’ values, copied from the request. These values include the 16 bit identifier field, and other fields,
randomised and validated by different ‘patches’ to DNS. We investigate the prominent patches, and show how off-path
attackers can circumvent all of them, exposing the resolvers to cache poisoning attacks.
We present countermeasures preventing our attacks; however, we believe that our attacks provide additional motivation for
adoption of DNSSEC (or other MitM-secure defenses).
We then investigate vulnerabilities in DNSSEC configuration among resolvers and zones, which reduce or even nullify the
protection offered by DNSSEC. Finally we provide our recommendations and countermeasures to prevent the vulnerabilities.
Contact
Stephanie Feyahn
302 71922
--email hidden
Video Broadcast
Yes
Kaiserslautern
G26
206
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logged in users only
Claudia Richter, 02/07/2013 14:45 -- Created document.