Kasper Rasmussen received an MSc in Information Technology and
Mathematics from the Technical University of Denmark in 2005. He got
his Ph.D. from the Department of Computer Science at ETH Zurich in
2011. During his Ph.D. he worked on various security issues including
secure time synchronization and secure localization with a particular
focus on distance bounding. At the end of his Ph.D., Kasper Rasmussen
received the ETH Medal for an outstanding dissertation, an award given
to 8% of finishing Ph.D. students. Kasper Rasmussen is currently
working as a postdoctoral researcher at University of California,
Irvine. His research interests include system security and security of
wireless networks; security of embedded and cyber-physical systems,
including smart grid nodes and hand held devices; protocol design and
applied cryptography.

AG 1, AG 2, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, MMCI   Info

Expert Audience

English

60 Minutes

Kaiserslautern

I will cover a couple of my recent contributions to secure
localization and distance bounding. Distance bounding protocols have
been proposed for many security critical applications as a means of
getting an upper bound on the physical distance to a communication
partner. I will show some practical examples of problems where
distance bounding can provide a unique solution to problems which are
otherwise difficult to solve. One such example is in the context of
implantable medical devices.

One of the main obstacles for the wider deployment of distance
bounding using electromagnetic (radio) waves, is the lack of hardware
platforms that implement and support these protocols. I will show the
first prototype system that demonstrates that radio distance bounding
protocols can be implemented to match the strict requirements on
processing time, that these protocols require. Our system implements a
radio that is able to receive, process and transmit signals in less
than 1ns.

Finally I will present an area where I see a great potential for
future work. In both sensing and actuation applications there is a
semantic gap between the electrical system and the physical world. In
an adversarial setting this gap can be exploited to make a system
believe that, e.g., a switch was activated, when in fact it
wasn't. there is a plethora application domains that share this
problem, from bio-medical sensors and implantable medical devices to
factory control systems and security critical infrastructures. Some
of these challenges can be solved using a traditional cryptographic
approach, and some are highly interdisciplinary, and will best be
handled in collaboration with experts from other fields.

Brigitta Hansen

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