Boris Koepf is a Ph.D. candidate at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology (ETH). His interests include information security, program
analysis and information flow, programming languages, and formal
methods.
Side-channel attacks have become so effective that they pose a real
threat to the security of cryptographic algorithms. This threat is not
covered by traditional notions of cryptographic security and models for
proving resistance against it are only now emerging. In this talk, I
will present work on such a model. It is based on concrete and realistic
assumptions about the attacker and it is tailored to synchronous
hardware, where faithful system models are available. The model leads to
meaningful metrics for assessing the resistance of a system to
side-channel attacks. I will show how these metrics can be computed and
be used for analyzing nontrivial hardware implementations for their
vulnerability to timing attacks. I will conclude with a number of
directions for further research.