Edith Elkind researches game theory and the computation of social choices. She looks at the decisions involved in multi-agent systems such as auctions, elections and co-operative games.

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AG Audience

English

60 Minutes

Kaiserslautern

Suppose that a group of voters wants to select k \ge 1 alternatives from a given set, and each voter indicates which of the alternatives are acceptable to her: the alternatives could be conference submissions, applicants for a scholarship or locations for a fast food chain. In this setting it is natural to require that the winning set represents the voters fairly, in the sense that large groups of voters with similar preferences have at least some of their approved alternatives in the winning set. We describe several ways to formalize this idea, and show how to use it to classify voting rules. For one of our axioms, the only known voting rule that satisfies it is not polynomial-time computable, and it was conjectured that no voting rule that satisfies this axiom can be polynomial-time computable; however, we will show that this is not the case.

Susanne Girard

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Yes

Saarbrücken

E1 5

029

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