Campus Event Calendar
Event Entry
New for: D3
What and Who
On Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms
Vangelis Markakis
Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Informatics
Talk
AG 1, AG 4, RG1, MMCI, AG 3, AG 5, SWS
AG Audience
English
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Date, Time and Location
Friday, 5 March 2010
13:00
45 Minutes
E1 4
024
Saarbrücken
Abstract
n this talk, we will be interested in identifying mechanisms
that maximize the final social welfare generated. To be able to
compare mechanisms with regard to their welfare, we introduce the
concept of "welfare
undominated" mechanisms. This concept induces a partial order on
mechanisms and we study the question of finding minimal elements with
respect to this partial order. We focus on two domains, namely, public
project problems and
multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders. We show that in the
first case the VCG mechanism is welfare undominated. In the
second domain we exhibit a family of mechanisms that are welfare
undominated and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. In fact we show
that among anonymous and linear mechanisms, this family coincides with
the set of welfare undominated mechanisms
that maximize the final social welfare generated. To be able to
compare mechanisms with regard to their welfare, we introduce the
concept of "welfare
undominated" mechanisms. This concept induces a partial order on
mechanisms and we study the question of finding minimal elements with
respect to this partial order. We focus on two domains, namely, public
project problems and
multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders. We show that in the
first case the VCG mechanism is welfare undominated. In the
second domain we exhibit a family of mechanisms that are welfare
undominated and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. In fact we show
that among anonymous and linear mechanisms, this family coincides with
the set of welfare undominated mechanisms
Contact
Angelina Vidali
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Tags, Category, Keywords and additional notes
mechanism design, game theory
Angelina Vidali, 02/25/2010 20:24 -- Created document.