Campus Event Calendar
Event Entry
What and Who
Near-optimal Multi-unit Auctions with Ordered Bidders
Sayan Bhattacharya
Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik - D1
AG1 Mittagsseminar (own work)
AG 1
AG Audience
English
Note: We use this to send email in the morning.
Date, Time and Location
Tuesday, 22 October 2013
13:00
30 Minutes
E1 4
024
Saarbrücken
Abstract
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid
vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-
highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments.
Joint work with E. Koutsoupias, J. Kulkarni, S. Leonardi, T. Roughgarden and X. Xu.
Contact
Sayan Bhattacharya
--email hidden
passcode not visible
logged in users only
Sayan Bhattacharya, 10/04/2013 12:14 -- Created document.