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Author, Editor

Author(s):

Vidali, Angelina

dblp



Editor(s):

Leonardi, Stefano

dblp

Not MPII Editor(s):

Leonardi, Stefano

BibTeX cite key*:

Vidali2009

Title, Booktitle

Title*:

The Geometry of Truthfulness

Booktitle*:

Internet and Network Economics : 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009

Event, URLs

URL of the conference:

http://www.dis.uniroma1.it/~wine09/

URL for downloading the paper:

http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~angelina/geometrytruth.pdf

Event Address*:

Rome, Italy

Language:

English

Event Date*
(no longer used):


Organization:


Event Start Date:

14 December 2009

Event End Date:

18 December 2009

Publisher

Name*:

Springer

URL:

http://www.springer.com/computer/lncs?SGWID=0-164-6-737109-0

Address*:

Berlin, Germany

Type:


Vol, No, Year, pp.

Series:

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volume:

5929

Number:


Month:


Pages:

340-350

Year*:

2009

VG Wort Pages:


ISBN/ISSN:

978-3-642-10840-2

Sequence Number:


DOI:

10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_31



Note, Abstract, ©


(LaTeX) Abstract:

We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and additive quasilinear utilities. We introduce a new method for describing the the allocation graph and the geometry of truthful mechanisms for an arbitrary number of items(/tasks). Applying this method we characterize all possible mechanisms for the case of three items.

Previous work shows that Monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness in convex domains. If there is only one item, monotonicity is the most practical description of truthfulness we could hope for, however for the case of more than two items and additive valuations (like in the scheduling domain) we would need a global and more intuitive description, hopefully also practical for proving lower bounds. We replace Monotonicity by a geometrical and global characterization of truthfulness.

Our results apply directly to the scheduling unrelated machines problem. Until now such a characterization was only known for the case of two tasks. It was one of the tools used for proving a lower bound of $1+\sqrt{2}$ for the case of 3 players. This makes our work potentially useful for obtaining improved lower bounds for this very important problem.

Finally we show lower bounds of $1+\sqrt{n}$ and $n$ respectively for two special classes of scheduling mechanisms, defined in terms of their geometry, demonstrating how geometrical considerations can lead to lower bound proofs.



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Access Level:

Public

Correlation

MPG Unit:

Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik



MPG Subunit:

Algorithms and Complexity Group

Appearance:

MPII WWW Server, MPII FTP Server, MPG publications list, university publications list, working group publication list, Fachbeirat, VG Wort



BibTeX Entry:

@INPROCEEDINGS{Vidali2009,
AUTHOR = {Vidali, Angelina},
EDITOR = {Leonardi, Stefano},
TITLE = {The Geometry of Truthfulness},
BOOKTITLE = {Internet and Network Economics : 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009},
PUBLISHER = {Springer},
YEAR = {2009},
VOLUME = {5929},
PAGES = {340--350},
SERIES = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
ADDRESS = {Rome, Italy},
ISBN = {978-3-642-10840-2},
DOI = {10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_31},
}


Entry last modified by Anja Becker, 03/09/2010
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Editor(s)
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Created
01/26/2010 06:18:25 PM
Revision
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Editor
Anja Becker
Angelina Vidali


Edit Date
09.03.2010 15:02:30
26.01.2010 18:18:25


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