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Author, Editor

Author(s):

Epstein, Leah
van Stee, Rob

dblp
dblp

Not MPG Author(s):

Epstein, Leah

Editor(s):

Monien, Burkhard
Schroeder, Ulf-Peter

dblp
dblp

Not MPII Editor(s):

Monien, Burkhard
Schroeder, Ulf-Peter

BibTeX cite key*:

vanStee2008

Title, Booktitle

Title*:

The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited


poa-sagt.dvi (60.15 KB)

Booktitle*:

Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, SAGT 2008

Event, URLs

URL of the conference:

http://sagt08.upb.de/

URL for downloading the paper:

http://www.springerlink.com/content/9883p3h807717292/fulltext.pdf

Event Address*:

Paderborn, Germany

Language:

English

Event Date*
(no longer used):


Organization:


Event Start Date:

30 April 2009

Event End Date:

2 May 2009

Publisher

Name*:

Springer

URL:

http://www.springer-ny.com/

Address*:

Berlin

Type:


Vol, No, Year, pp.

Series:

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Volume:

4997

Number:


Month:

April

Pages:

46-57

Year*:

2008

VG Wort Pages:

12

ISBN/ISSN:

0302-9743

Sequence Number:


DOI:

10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_6



Note, Abstract, ©


(LaTeX) Abstract:

Recent interest in Nash equilibria led to a study of the {\it
price of anarchy} (PoA) and the {\it strong price of anarchy}
(SPoA) for scheduling problems. The two
measures express the worst case ratio between the cost of an
equilibrium (a pure Nash equilibrium, and a strong equilibrium,
respectively) to the cost of a social optimum.

We consider scheduling on uniformly related machines.
Here the atomic players are the jobs, and the delay of a job is the
completion time of the machine running it, also called the load
of this machine. The social goal is to minimize the maximum delay
of any job, while the selfish goal of each job is to minimize its
own delay, that is, the delay of the machine running it.

While previous studies either consider identical speed machines or an
arbitrary number of speeds, focusing on the number of machines as
a parameter, we consider the situation in which the number of
different speeds is small. We reveal a linear dependence between
the number of speeds and the poa. For a set of machines of at
most $p$ speeds, the PoA turns out to be exactly $p+1$. The
growth of the PoA for large numbers of related machines is
therefore a direct result of the large number of potential speeds.
We further consider a well known structure of processors, where
all machines are of the same speed except for one possibly faster
machine. We investigate the PoA as a function of both the speed
of the fastest machine and the number of slow machines, and give
tight bounds for nearly all cases.

Keywords:

algorithmic game theory, scheduling, price of anarchy



Download
Access Level:

Public

Correlation

MPG Unit:

Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik



MPG Subunit:

Algorithms and Complexity Group

Audience:

experts only

Appearance:

MPII WWW Server, MPII FTP Server, MPG publications list, university publications list, working group publication list, Fachbeirat, VG Wort



BibTeX Entry:

@INPROCEEDINGS{vanStee2008,
AUTHOR = {Epstein, Leah and van Stee, Rob},
EDITOR = {Monien, Burkhard and Schroeder, Ulf-Peter},
TITLE = {The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited},
BOOKTITLE = {Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, SAGT 2008},
PUBLISHER = {Springer},
YEAR = {2008},
VOLUME = {4997},
PAGES = {46--57},
SERIES = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
ADDRESS = {Paderborn, Germany},
MONTH = {April},
ISBN = {0302-9743},
DOI = {10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_6},
}


Entry last modified by Rob van Stee, 12/10/2010
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Editor(s)
Rob van Stee
Created
01/12/2009 12:39:52 PM
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Editor
Rob van Stee
Rob van Stee


Edit Date
12-10-2010 15:35:39
01/12/2009 12:39:52 PM


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