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 Author, Editor(s)
 Author(s): Bonifaci, Vincenzo Harks, Tobias Schäfer, Guido dblp dblp dblp Not MPG Author(s): Harks, Tobias Schäfer, Guido
 BibTeX cite key*: Bonifaci:2009:a

 Title
 Title*: Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks Attachment(s): Bonifaci2010b.pdf (270.74 KB); ATTCYBW3.pdf (270.74 KB)

 Journal
 Journal Title*: Mathematics of Operations Research Journal's URL: http://mor.journal.informs.org/ Download URL for the article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0442 Language: English

 Publisher
 Publisher's Name: INFORMS Publisher's URL: http://www.informs.org/ Publisher's Address: Hanover, USA ISSN: 0364-765X

 Vol, No, pp, Date
 Volume*: 35 Number: 2 Publishing Date: May 2010 Pages*: 330 - 346 Number of VG Pages: Page Start: 330 Page End: 346 Sequence Number: DOI: 10.1287/moor.1100.0442v1

 Note: (LaTeX) Abstract: We investigate the impact of \emph{Stackelberg routing} to reduce the price of anarchy in network routing games. In this setting, an $\alpha$ fraction of the entire demand is first routed centrally according to a predefined \emph{Stackelberg strategy} and the remaining demand is then routed selfishly by (nonatomic) players. Although several advances have been made recently in proving that Stackelberg routing can in fact significantly reduce the price of anarchy for certain network topologies, the central question of whether this holds true in general is still open. We answer this question negatively by constructing a family of single-commodity instances such that every Stackelberg strategy induces a price of anarchy that grows linearly with the size of the network. Moreover, we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy of the Largest-Latency-First (LLF) strategy that only depend on the size of the network. Besides other implications, this rules out the possibility to construct constant-size networks to prove an unbounded price of anarchy. In light of this negative result, we consider bicriteria bounds. We develop an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy that induces a flow whose cost is at most the cost of an optimal flow with respect to demands scaled by a factor of $1 + \sqrt{1-\alpha}$. Finally, we analyze the effectiveness of an easy-to-implement Stackelberg strategy, called SCALE. We prove bounds for a general class of latency functions that includes polynomial latency functions as a special case. Our analysis is based on an approach which is simple, yet powerful enough to obtain (almost) tight bounds for SCALE in general networks. URL for the Abstract: Categories, Keywords: Network Routing Games, Stackelberg Routing, Inefficiency of Equilibria HyperLinks / References / URLs: Copyright Message: Personal Comments: Download Access Level: Public

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 MPG Unit: Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik MPG Subunit: Algorithms and Complexity Group Audience: experts only Appearance: MPII WWW Server, MPII FTP Server, MPG publications list, university publications list, working group publication list, Fachbeirat, VG Wort

BibTeX Entry:

@ARTICLE{Bonifaci:2009:a,
AUTHOR = {Bonifaci, Vincenzo and Harks, Tobias and Sch{\"a}fer, Guido},
TITLE = {Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks},
JOURNAL = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
PUBLISHER = {INFORMS},
YEAR = {2010},
NUMBER = {2},
VOLUME = {35},
PAGES = {330 -- 346},