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Author, Editor(s)
Author(s):
Bonifaci, Vincenzo
Harks, Tobias
Schäfer, Guido
dblp
dblp
dblp
Not MPG Author(s):
Harks, Tobias
Schäfer, Guido
BibTeX cite key*:
Bonifaci:2009:a
Title
Title*:
Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
Attachment(s):
Bonifaci2010b.pdf (270.74 KB); ATTCYBW3.pdf (270.74 KB)
Journal
Journal Title*:
Mathematics of Operations Research
Journal's URL:
http://mor.journal.informs.org/
Download URL
for the article:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0442
Language:
English
Publisher
Publisher's
Name:
INFORMS
Publisher's URL:
http://www.informs.org/
Publisher's
Address:
Hanover, USA
ISSN:
0364-765X
Vol, No, pp, Date
Volume*:
35
Number:
2
Publishing Date:
May 2010
Pages*:
330 - 346
Number of
VG Pages:
Page Start:
330
Page End:
346
Sequence Number:
DOI:
10.1287/moor.1100.0442v1
Note, Abstract, ©
Note:
(LaTeX) Abstract:
We investigate the impact of \emph{Stackelberg routing} to reduce the price of anarchy in network routing games. In this setting, an $\alpha$ fraction of the entire demand is first routed centrally according to a predefined \emph{Stackelberg strategy} and the remaining demand is then routed selfishly by (nonatomic) players. Although several advances have been made recently in proving that Stackelberg routing can in fact significantly reduce the price of anarchy for certain network topologies, the central question of whether this holds true in general is still open. We answer this question negatively by constructing a family of single-commodity instances such that every Stackelberg strategy induces a price of anarchy that grows linearly with the size of the network.
Moreover, we prove upper bounds on the price of anarchy of the Largest-Latency-First (LLF) strategy that only depend on the size of the network. Besides other implications, this rules out the possibility to construct constant-size networks to prove an unbounded price of anarchy.
In light of this negative result, we consider bicriteria bounds. We develop an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy that induces a flow whose cost is at most the cost of an optimal flow with respect to demands scaled by a factor of $1 + \sqrt{1-\alpha}$.
Finally, we analyze the effectiveness of an easy-to-implement Stackelberg strategy, called SCALE. We prove bounds for a general class of latency functions that includes polynomial latency functions as a special case. Our analysis is based on an approach which is simple, yet powerful enough to obtain (almost) tight bounds for SCALE in general networks.
URL for the Abstract:
Categories,
Keywords:
Network Routing Games, Stackelberg Routing, Inefficiency of Equilibria
HyperLinks / References / URLs:
Copyright Message:
Personal Comments:
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Access Level:
Public
Correlation
MPG Unit:
Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik
MPG Subunit:
Algorithms and Complexity Group
Audience:
experts only
Appearance:
MPII WWW Server, MPII FTP Server, MPG publications list, university publications list, working group publication list, Fachbeirat, VG Wort
BibTeX Entry:
@ARTICLE
{
Bonifaci:2009:a
,
AUTHOR = {Bonifaci, Vincenzo and Harks, Tobias and Sch{\"a}fer, Guido},
TITLE = {Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks},
JOURNAL = {Mathematics of Operations Research},
PUBLISHER = {INFORMS},
YEAR = {2010},
NUMBER = {2},
VOLUME = {35},
PAGES = {330 -- 346},
ADDRESS = {Hanover, USA},
MONTH = {May},
ISBN = {0364-765X},
DOI = {10.1287/moor.1100.0442v1},
}
Entry last modified by Vincenzo Bonifaci, 01/02/2012
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Editor(s)
[Library]
Created
12/20/2010 06:32:16 PM
Revisions
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
Editor(s)
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Vincenzo Bonifaci
Edit Dates
01/02/2012 06:50:33 PM
02/10/2011 05:04:55 PM
02/10/2011 05:03:39 PM
02/10/2011 05:02:15 PM
02/10/2011 05:01:31 PM
Attachment Section
Attachment Section
Bonifaci2010b.pdf
ATTCYBW3.pdf
Bonifaci2010b.pdf
ATTCYBW3.pdf