Campus Event Calendar

Event Entry

New for: D3

What and Who

On Welfare Undominated Groves Mechanisms

Vangelis Markakis
Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of Informatics
AG 1, AG 4, RG1, MMCI, AG 3, AG 5, SWS  
AG Audience

Date, Time and Location

Friday, 5 March 2010
45 Minutes
E1 4


n this talk, we will be interested in identifying mechanisms
that maximize the final social welfare generated. To be able to
compare mechanisms with regard to their welfare, we introduce the
concept of "welfare
undominated" mechanisms. This concept induces a partial order on
mechanisms and we study the question of finding minimal elements with
respect to this partial order. We focus on two domains, namely, public
project problems and
multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders. We show that in the
first case the VCG mechanism is welfare undominated. In the
second domain we exhibit a family of mechanisms that are welfare
undominated and include the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. In fact we show
that among anonymous and linear mechanisms, this family coincides with
the set of welfare undominated mechanisms


Angelina Vidali
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Tags, Category, Keywords and additional notes

mechanism design, game theory

Angelina Vidali, 02/25/2010 20:24 -- Created document.