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Event Entry

What and Who

Traffic Correlation on Tor by Realistic Adversaries

Aaron Johnson
US Naval Research Laboratory
SWS Colloquium

Aaron Johnson is a computer scientist at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
A general theme of his research is designing protocols to provide good, provable tradeoffs between privacy and utility.
Specifically, he is working on private data publishing and anonymous communication protocols.
SWS, MMCI  
Expert Audience
English

Date, Time and Location

Monday, 29 July 2013
13:00
90 Minutes
E1 5
029
Saarbrücken

Abstract

We present the first analysis of the popular Tor anonymity network that indicates the security of typical users against reasonably realistic adversaries in the Tor network or in the underlying Internet. Our results show that Tor users are far more susceptible to compromise than indicated by prior work. Specific contributions include
(1) a model of various typical kinds of users,
(2) an adversary model that includes Tor network relays, autonomous systems (ASes), Internet exchange points (IXPs), and groups of IXPs drawn from empirical study
(3) metrics that indicate how secure users are over a period of time,
(4) the most accurate topological model to date of ASes and IXPs as they relate to Tor usage and network configuration,
(5) a novel realistic Tor path simulator (TorPS), and
(6) analyses of security making use of all the above.
To show that our approach is useful to explore alternatives and not just Tor as currently deployed, we also analyze a published alternative path selection algorithm, Congestion-Aware Tor. We create an empirical model of Tor congestion, identify novel attack vectors, and show that it too is more vulnerable than previously indicated.

Contact

Claudia Richter
9303 9103
--email hidden

Video Broadcast

Yes
Kaiserslautern
G26
113
passcode not visible
logged in users only

Claudia Richter, 07/29/2013 16:51
Claudia Richter, 07/26/2013 11:40 -- Created document.