Campus Event Calendar
Event Entry
New for: D1, D2, D3, D4, D5
What and Who
Loss and Delay Accountability for the Internet
Katerina Argyraki
EPFL, Switzerland
SWS Colloquium
Katerina Argyraki obtained her PhD in Electrical Engineering from
Stanford University in 2006 and is currently a research scientist at
EPFL, Switzerland. She did her PhD studies under the guidance of Prof.
David Cheriton in the Distributed Systems Group, where she worked on
the TRIAD project and developed AITF---a network-based solution to
bandwidth flooding. She also weaved in a few startup stints---a summer
at Kealia (now part of Sun), another one at BlueArc, and, finally, a
year at Arastra, before joining EPFL in 2007. Her research interests
lie in the areas of network architecture and protocols with a focus on
denial-of-service defenses and accountability solutions.
AG 1, AG 2, AG 3, AG 4, AG 5, SWS, RG1, RG2
AG Audience
English
Note: We use this to send email in the morning.
Date, Time and Location
Wednesday, 12 September 2007
11:00
60 Minutes
E1 5
rotunda 6th floor
Saarbrücken
Abstract
The Internet provides no information on the fate of transmitted
packets, and end systems cannot determine who is responsible for
dropping or delaying their traffic. As a result, they cannot verify
that their ISPs are honoring their service level agreements, nor can
they react to adverse network conditions appropriately. While current
probing tools provide some assistance in this regard, they only give
feedback on probes, not actual traffic. Moreover, service providers
could, at any time, render their network opaque to such tools.
I will present AudIt, an explicit "accountability interface" for the
Internet, through which
ISPs can pro-actively supply feedback to traffic sources on loss and
delay, at administrative-domain granularity. AudIt benefits not only
end systems, but also ISPs, because---in contrast to probing
tools---it allows them to control the amount and quality of
information revealed about their internal structure and policy. I will
show that AudIt is resistant to ISP lies in a business-sensible threat
model and can be implemented with a modest NetFlow modification.
Finally, I will discuss a Click-based prototype, which introduced less
than 2% bandwidth overhead on real traces from a Tier-1 ISP.
Contact
Brigitta Hansen
9325200
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Brigitta Hansen, 09/13/2007 15:32 -- Created document.