AG 1   Info

AG Audience

English

30 Minutes

Saarbrücken

Consider a cloud server, where clients can submit jobs for processing. The quality of service that each agent receives is given by a private non-decreasing function of the completion time of her job. The server has to process the jobs and charge each agent while trying to optimize the social cost that is defined as the energy expenditure plus the sum of the values of the internal cost functions. The server operator would like to design a mechanism in order to optimize this objective, which ideally is computationally tractable, charges the users “fairly” and the induced game has an equilibrium. We present a mechanism that combines the aforementioned properties with a constant Price of Anarchy. An interesting feature of our mechanism is that it is indirect: each user needs only to declare an upper bound on the completion time of her job, and not the cost function.

This is joint work with Antonios Antoniadis.

Antonios Antoniadis

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